True mettle of a leader, political or military, is gauged when he faces adversarial situation(s), when a disaster seems imminent. When commoners lose hope and stumble to blunders, worsening the state of affairs, real leaders, showing grace under pressure, display true headship and come up with extra ordinary plans and strategies: which turn the table on the opponents or dull the defeat. Great leaders do not put their hands up, without having exerted. Was fall of East Pakistan unavoidably imminent? Wasn’t there any option(s) available for political and military leadership other than accepting a disgraceful defeat and subsequently signing an ignoble surrender?
Reflecting back at history, we find that fall of East Pakistan did not occur in days or weeks; in fact, when Ayoub Khan abrogated the constitution of Pakistan (1956), he laid the very foundation of the fall of Pakistan. (waqt karta ha parwarish barsu, haadsa ek dam ni houta)
At that time, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardi, one of the founding fathers of Pakistan and erstwhile Prime Minister (1956 to 1957) shed tears, foreseeing (inexorably) disintegration of Pakistan. It is pertinent to mention here that Mr. Huseyn Shaheed shed tears on two more occasions: when he met Fatima Jinnah (when she threw keys to him from upstairs in Karachi; she had no trust in her guards deputed by Ayoub Khan) and when he (Huseyn Shaheed) was dethroned, mourning that he had a plan to liberate Kashmir which had been dismantled. Had Ayoub Khan not nailed the unity, touching constitution, our history would have been different.
Before the general elections which were held on 7 December 1970, the differences between Awami League and PPP were all time high, making the situation deeply precarious. Besides, when flood swept across Bangladesh, wreaking havoc, adversely affecting infrastructure, life and property of people: those trying times called for concerted efforts to save the injured and sick and rehabilitate them, bringing normality, not holding the elections. Taking as a God gifted opportunity, elections could have been adjourned for a year at least; and during that period, our political and military leadership could have ample time to analyze the issues and chalk out alternative plans to address the grievances of people and deflect wicked designs of internal and external enemies.
The process of rehabilitation could certainly had won back empathies of disgruntled brothers, thus nefarious plans of the enemies could have been exposed and thwarted. We could have avoided Waterloo, but our leadership self-centered, shortsighted, that opportunity was thrown into Bay of Bengal.
At strategic level, the throaty claim of Lt. General Ameer Abdullah Khan, then Commander of Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army to defend every inch of land was totally flawed. Many local supporters and young officers including Brig. Sultan, then Col. Sultan Ahmed, commanding 30 Baloch Regiment, communicated through proper military channels the alternate options which were more workable during those desperate times. Even today, military strategists lament the fact that two adept military plans were available for military leadership, but they were not exercised.
According to plan one, the entire military forces were be converged between two rivers: Ganges and Brahmaputra. It is worth to remember that there was no bridge on Ganges that time. In the next step, all sympathizers and supporters of Mukti Bahini could have been dispersed on both sides of the rivers, thereby weakening their strength. Consequently, the supporters and sympathizers of Mukti Bahini had to cross to India, creating refugee problem for Indian government and its army, engaged in arming and training Mukti Bahini.
That deployment of our forces could have made our defense impenetrable: our navy headed by then Vice Admiral Sharif had established blockade, totally preventing Indian navy from any build up. Even a prolong war could not have let the Indians forces advance. We would have three airports: Dhaka, Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar in our control. Those locals were ready to dig trenches to impede any Indian military advancement. Had that options been exercised, there would be East Pakistan between two rivers, at least. The plan in question was also mentioned by General Musharraf (a major in 1971), in an interview, articulating that he would have moved his forces between two rivers.
There was yet another military plan shared by locals (loyalists to Pakistan) with our military leadership. According to plan two, our forces could have taken a defense on Commila Line stretching up to chicken neck, very close of our tried and tested friend China besides Nepal,Bhuttan, Burma, thus engaging and frustrating the entire Indian military—even for decades. Military strategists still believe that the military plan would have ensured Pakistan an indomitable superiority. But General Niazi, General Yahya Khan and other military commanders had other plans which did not entail any imaginable victory or a formidable fight.
At the political and diplomatic front, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was too desperate to grab power, even at the cost of country. At the UN, Pakistan was desperately looking for a UN Security Council Resolution. That opportunity was provided by Poland, submitting a resolution for discussion on December 15, urging India and Pakistan to accept an immediate ceasefire and withdraw the forces from each other’s territory and transfer power to the representatives elected in December 1970. It was golden chance to avoid the dishonorable surrender and the subsequent imprisonment of thousands of our soldiers and civil servants. But the ulterior motive of Zulfiqar Bhutto to grab power and humiliate Pakistan army provoked him to lambast the UN for acting belatedly and tore the resolution, thereby scratching yet another option to save the fall of East Pakistan.